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Ca$e No. 14627 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEAT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The issues are procedural. The questions are whether 
a divorce decree is final as to child support orders in the 
sense that the action is no longer pending and whether it is 
appropriate to take a deposition in aii attempt to recover 
child support arrearages without first filing a pleading. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOW^R COURT 
Judge Bryant H. Croft on June 4, 197 6, decreed as 
follows: 
1. The signing of a divorce decree closes the action 
and specific relief must be plead in brder for there to be 
a justici±>le issue upon which further discovery may be pre-
dicated. 
2. The Utah Department of |Social Services may be 
joined as a real party in interest ir^  a divorce case where 
it has provided support, received an assignment, made proper 
application and given proper notice. This ruling was later 
sustained by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Social 
Services v. Margo Bartholomew, March 76. 
3. No seperate action need be filed by the 
Department of Social Services as its petition to intervene 
is based upon a support order in the divorce decree. 
4. The attorney is deemed relieved of fur-
ther representation upon the filing of the divorce decree, 
and service may not be had on defendant by mailing a copy 
of the notice of taking deposition to the attorney six years 
after the case was closed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have provisions #1 and 
#4 upheld and to have an order entered requiring the State 
Department of Social Services to file a pleading before it 
takes depositions in support arrearage cases. 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
Defendant Thomas Mattingly was formerly married 
to Kathryn Mattingly. Two children were born of the marriage. 
A final divorce decree was entered May 15, 1970, requiring 
defendant to pay child support of $50 for each child per 
month. 
The Utah State Department of Social Services, 
represented by the attorney general's office, about January 
27, 1976, filed an ex parte motion and became a party to the 
case, pursuant to statute. The motion was accompanied by an 
affidavit signed by the assistant attorney general, Stephen 
Schwendiman, v/ho claimed no personal knowledge of statements 
in the affidavit. 
A copy of the ex parte motion to join and the order 
of joinder, along with a notice of taking defendants depos-
ition, were mailed January 27, 1976, to Attorney Don Bybee,
 v-
had represented the defendant in the original proceeding, 
and to Attorney Ray Grossman, who had represented the plain-
tiff in the original proceedings. 
On January 30, 1976, Mr. Grossman filed notice that 
he did not represent or know the whereabouts of either 
Kathryn L. Mattingly or Thomas C. Mattingly. 
On February 3, 1976/ Mr. Bybee filed objection to 
the interpleader and taking of deposition alleging: 
1. The divorce action is closed. 
2. The Utah Department of Social Services is not 
a real party in interest. 
3. A separate action should be filed before a 
deposition can be taken. 
4. One cannot serve a defendant by mailing to his 
former attorney after a case in concluded. 
These objections were heard by Judge Bryant Croft 
on June 4, 1976. He ruled in favor of Attorney Bybee on 




THE SIGNING OF A DIVORCE DECREE IN UTAH IS 
FINAL AS TO PAST DUE SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND, UNTIL OR UNLESS 
MODIFIED, AS TO FUTURE SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
Under UCA 30-3-5, the court retains contin-
uing jurisdiction to deal with custody and support matters 
and may make such modifications and alterations as the court 
deems equitable and necessary. 
However, the court on numerous occassions has 
recognized the finality of past due support payments. See 
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P2d 528; Myers v. Myers, 62 U 90, 
218 P 123, 30 ALR 74; Cole v. Cole, 101 U 355, 122 P2d 201; 
Larsen v. Larsen, 9 U2d 160, 340 P2d 421; Openshaw v. Openshaw, 
102 U 22, 126 P2d 1068. 
Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P2d 231, 26 U2d 436, 
admittedly recognizes the continuing jurisdiction of the court 
to deal with support matters and the different character of 
support orders as claimed by appellant in his brief. But 
the case did not address the question of whether past due 
support payments were final orders; rather the court's dis-
position of the case recognized the finality of support orders. 
In Harmon, the ex-wife had brought suit to recover support 
arrearages due under a divorce decree. The lower court en-
tered judgment for her along with a stay of execution on that 
judgment so long as the defendant made regular future payments 
along with some partial payment on the arrearage. The plain-
tiff's ex-wife objected to that stay. It was in upholding 
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that stay that the Supreme Court spoke of the different char-
acter of support orders and in so doing was recognizing the 
finality of past due payments (orders). 
We submit that the other four cases appellant 
relies on to support his position that a decree is not final 
as to the support rights of children also fail to address the 
question. 
Rees v. Archibald, 6 U2d 864, 311 P2d 788, stands 
for the proposition that a father's responsibility for his 
child's support is not affected by a divorce decree that 
does not award support payments. 
Bott v. Bott, 20 U2d 329, 437 P2d 684, was a con-
tempt proceeding in which the court held that it retained 
jurisdiction to modify a divorce decree regarding the dis-
tribution of property, a position that is neither attacked 
by appellee nor supportive of appellant's position. 
In Harrison v. Harrison, 22 U2d 180, 450 P2d 456, 
the question was whether particular modifications made by the 
lower court were proper. Although the question of the fi-
nality of a divorce decree was not addressed, such a position 
is not inconsistent with the holding of the case. 
In Riding v. Riding, 329 P2d 878, 3 U2d 136, the 
Supreme Court held that a former wife, by stipulation, could 
not relieve her former husband of child support obligations 
imposed by a divorce decree. 
In none of these cases was the Supreme Court asked 
to answer the question of whether a divorce decree is final 
-5-
as to the support rights of children- Each of the cases, 
including those recognizing the continuing jurisdiction of 
the court to modify a decree, is consistent with the position 
that a divorce decree is final as to support rights. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUANCE OF A SUBPEONA TO COMPEL ATTEND-
ANCE FOR DEPOSITION PRECEEDINGS WITHOUT FIRST FILING A PLEAD-
ING ALLEGING AN ARREARAGE IN SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND ASKING FOR 
JUDGMENT, EXECUTION, OR CONTEMPT IS NOT APPROPRIATE. 
"Rule 26 (b) (1) In general. Parties may 
obtain discovery regarding any matter, 
not privileged, which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending 
action . . . " [Emphasis added] 
"Rule 30 (a) When Deposition may be taken. 
After commencement of the action, any 
party may take the testimony of any per-
son . . . Leave of court . . . must be 
obtained only if the plaintiff seeks to 
take a deposition prior to the expiration 
of thirty days after service . . . " 
[Emphasis added] 
Thus it is clear that the Supreme Court in-
tended that an action be commenced or be pending in order for 
deposition proceedings to be properly held. To argue that 
the commencement of the original divorce proceedings satisfies 
this requirement completely ignores the finality aspect of 
a divorce decree. (See Point I regarding finality.) 
A case should no longer be considered pending 
once a final decree has been entered and the case closed. 
See UCA, 30-3-7. 
"When decree becomes absolute. The decree 
of divorce shall become absolute at the 
expiration of three months from the entry 
thereof . . . " 
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It is therefore apparent that tihree months after 
entry of a divorce decree, such decree i$ final, the case 
is closed, and the action is not longer pending. 
The fact that the decree is final does not preclude 
the re-opening of the case to modify or alter some provision 
of the decree. This possibility, however, does not change 
the final character of the divorce decree. Again see Point 
I. 
In order, then, for a deposition to be taken, the 
inquiring party must take some step to once again cause the 
action to be commenced or considered pending. This is typ-
ically done by issuing an order to show cause, by the instit-
ution of contempt proceedings, or by asking for a writ of 
execution under URCP 69. 
That this is the practice in 0tah is evident by 
the numerous Utah cases which exemplify the procedure to 
be followed when enforcement of a divorce decree is sought. 
See McKay v. McKay, 370 P2d 358, 13 U2d 187, where the plain-
tiff sought to collect past due support money awarded for a 
minor child by bringing an order to shdw cause proceeding 
seeking to have her former husband held in contempt; Hall 
v. Hall, 326 P2d 707, 7 U2d 413, where an action was brought 
to reduce unpaid support money to judgment; Larsen v. Larsen, 
300 P2 596, 5 U2d 224, a suit against a former husband for 
past due child support payments awarded by a divorce decree; 
Harris v. Harris, 377 P2d 1007, 14 U2d 96, a proceeding by 
a divorced wife to have her divorced husband found in contempt 
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for failure to comply with provisions of the divorce decree 
and to recover delinquent support money. 
See also Brown v. Brown, 228 P2d 816, where the 
contempt procedure was followed; T?allis v. T-?allis, 342 P2d 
103, 9 U2d 2 37, a proceeding to hold plaintiff's former hus-
band in contempt and for judgment for all arrearages in 
support since the entry of the divorce decree; Pluckard v. 
Anderson, 333 P2d 1065, 8 U2d 299, which involved supple-
mental proceedings for unpaid support money. 
See further Smith v. Bray, 357 P2d 189, 11 U2d 
218, an action by a divorced wife against her former husband 
to obtain delinquent support payments for a minor child; 
Atkinson v. Strong, 490 P2d 729, 26 U2d 405, where a former 
wife sought judgment for past due support payments and to 
have her former husband punished for contempt. 
In all of these cases, action was taken to again 
bring the defendant before the court before the question of 
past due support payments was explored. 
In Shaffield v. Shaffield, 34 So2d 591, the plain-
tiff filed a bill to cancel a deed for her former husband's 
land to his new wife so that said land could be used to pay 
back alimony and support. In that same bill, plaintiff also 
asked for discovery, alleging that such "discovery is nec-
essary to enable complainant to reach and subject the same 
to the satisfaction of said amount due and to become under 
the decree." Here again it was recognized that automatic 
discovery is not appropriate when a final decree has closed 
a divorce case. 
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Installments of support allowances when due and un-
paid become final judgments and maybe collected in the same 
manner as other judgments. Schaffer v. District Court In and 
For the City and County of Denver, 470 P2d 18, 172 Colo 43; 
Sproston v. Sproston, 505 P2d 479, 3 Wash App. 218; Beiter 
v. Beiter, 265 NE2d 324, 24 Ohio App. 149. 
Proceedings to enforce an order for the payment of 
money for the support of minor children are subject to any 
valid defense against the required payment. Armstrong v. 
Green, 260 Ala 39, 68 So2d 834; Lear v. Lear, 189 P2d 237, 
29 Wash 2d 692. 
Shaw v. Pilcher, 341 P2d 949, 9 U2d 222, and 
McGavin v. McGavin, 494 P2d 283, 27 U2d 200, recognized 
the propriety of defending against child support orders. 
And in Boyle v. Baggs, 350 P2d 622, 10 U2d 
203, the court said, "Even though the decree recites the 
monthly payments to be made, a number of situations may 
exist where there would be no debt under the decree and 
which facts would not be shown by an examination of the 
record . . . As between the parties such circumstances could 
be shown in any determination of the amount due under the 
decree." 
Without the partyj wishing to take a deposition 
taking some step that would cause a diyorce action to be 
re-opened or re-commenced so that it is once again pending, 
the defendant party to be deposed would have no oppor-
tunity to defend in court. 
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Appellant relies on Scheffer v. Scheffer, 48 NYS2d 
839, 183 Misc. 344, to show the propriety of allowing the 
use of depositions for determining the financial status of 
the husband after a decree of divorce has been entered. T<Ie 
do not dispute the propriety of using depositions for such 
purposes. We argue that if a deposition is to be taken, it 
can be taken only after a pleading has caused the case to 
again be pending. In Scheffer this requirement had been met 
as the wife was bringing a contempt action against her for-
mer husband for failure to pay alimony. 
We agree with appellant when he says " . . . there 
must be some tool available to parties to establish what the 
situation is relative to child support payments." 
(Appellant's brief p.8. ) we contend, however, that proper 
procedure must be used when such tools are brought into play. 
Appellant speaks of inexpensive methods and the 
conservation of tax dollars as reasons to shortcut the proper 
procedures. We submit that such are not sufficient reasons 
to shortcut and circumvent clear rules, case laws, and due 
process rights. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO KNOW WHAT FACTS ARE 
RELEVANT TO A DEPOSITION AND IS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS IF 
HE IS COMPELLED TO SUBMIT TO A FISHING EXPEDITION BY THE 
OPPOSITION BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION BY A 
PLEADING. 
Utah Code 30-3-5 provides that a divorce court re-
tains jurisdiction to deal with custody and child support 
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matters; that proposition is not attacked nor is it relevant 
to this appeal. What is at issue is the manner in which such 
matters are commenced. The Utah Code 30-3-1 provides: 
"Proceedings in divorce shall be commenced and 
conducted in the manner providted by law for 
proceedings in civil cases. . ." 
Civil cases are to be commenced under URCP 3 by 
" (1) by filing a complaint with the court. . . (c) The court 
shall have jurisdiction from the time of filing the complaint 
or the service of the summons." 
It is aximomatic that civil c^ses are to be con-
ducted consistently with the tenants of due process. 
Merely notifying a defendant that his deposition 
is to be taken in connection with a divorce case in which a 
final decree has been entered does not give the defendant 
notice as to what the subject matter of the inquiry may be. 
Due process requires that some sort of pleading — order to 
show cause, citation, order to enforce judgment, writ of 
execution— be filed to delineate the issues. 
Support money judgments are based on defaults oc-
curring after entry of the divorce decree from which they are 
derived and a former husband as allegecf judgment debtor in 
such proceedings is entitled to due process of law, so as to 
know the claimed facts and can controvert them in court if 
he elects. Ditmar v. Ditmar, 293 P2d 759, 48 Wash 2d 373. 
Pleadings are to frame and present the issues to 
be tried, vis; state, define, and limit the issues that are 
presented for determination at the tri^l. Tate v. Rose 35 U 
229, 99P 1003. Toone v. J.O. O'Neill Const. Co. 40U 265, 121 P 1 
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The due process requirement is again emphasized in 
URCP 7, which provides in part: 
"(1) Motions. An application to the Court for 
an order shall be by motion which, unless made 
during a hearing or trial, shall be made in wri-
ting, shall state with particularity the grounds 
therefore, and shall set forth the relief or 
order sought . . . " (Emphasis added) 
One of the inherent equity powers of the court is 
the enforcement of support orders. These actions are taken 
by citation, order to show cause, or by contempt proceedings. 
Uerzog v. Bramel, 82 U 216, 23 P2d 345. 
To secure any of these actions, the moving party 
must allege and prove the alleged conditions. Chaffee v. 
Chaffee, 63 U. 261, 225 P. 76. Rockwood v. Rockwood, 65 U 
261, 236 P. 457. Hampton v. Hampton, 86 U. 570, 47 P2d 419. 
Hodification of a decree is obtained by the filing 
of a petition and the petition must set forth facts alleging 
a change of conditions or be dismissed. Jones v. Jones, 104 
U. 275, 139 P2d 222. These allegations must set forth the 
new matter or facts in a verified petition or affidavit in 
a formal manner and it should be stated therein, in clear 
and concise terms, just what the applicant complains of and 
what he desires to prove. Cody v. Cody, 47 U. 456, 154 P. 
952, distinguished in 58 U. 228, 198 P. 165. 
It is clear from the record that no petition, com-
plaint, order to show cause, contempt citation, or action 
to enforce judgment, either verified or unverified, formal 
or informal, has been filed. 
Appellant's ex parte motion for order for joinder 
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of parties is not such a pleading since it fails to comply 
with the due process notice of requirements of a pleading. 
Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated 78-45-9 also 
recognizes the necessity of an action being commenced when 
it gives the Attorney General's office responsibility of 
representing the State Department of Social Services "when-
ever any court action is commenced" by that department. A 
motion for joinder may give the Department the right to 
commence an action, but that motion alone commences nothing. 
POINT IV 
AN ATTORNEY IS DEEMED RELIEVED OF FURTHER REP-
RESENTATION OF A CLIENT UPON THE ENTRY OF A FINAL DECREE 
AND SERVICE ON DEFENDANT MAY NOT BE HAD BY MAILING NOTICE 
TO THE FORMER ATTORNEY. 
An attorney is hired to bring an action to judg-
ment only and is deemed relieved of further representation 
upon the entry of a final decree in the case. Sandall v. 
Sandall, 57 U 150, 193 P. 1093, 15 ALR 620. 
This principal was followed in Schuler v. Dickson, 
243 P 377, which, quoting from Sandall, said, "It is always 
a presumption that an attorney is employed to conduct the 
litigation to judgment and no further; the relation of at-
torney and client and the general powers of the attorney cease 
upon the rendition and entry of the judgment." 
It follows, then, that since the authority of the 
attorney for defendant in a divorce proceeding terminates 
upon entry of the final divorce decree, subsequent notice to 
that attorney is without effect upon the defendant. 
-13-
In the Sandall case, supra, a divorce decree had 
been rendered in favor of plaintiff who several years later 
moved to have the decree modified, serving notice of said 
motion upon the attorney who had represented the defendant 
in the original divorce action. The Supreme Court held that 
service should not have been made upon defendant's former 
attorney and that such service alone was not sufficient to 
give the court jurisdiction over the defendant. 
Attorney Bybee here represented the defendant in 
the above-entitled case in the original divorce action in 
197 0 but has not subsequently been employed or retained by 
his former client in connection with the divorce. The ap-
pearance of Attorney Bybee has been a special appearance 
only to contest service and the attempt on the part of the 
State Attorney General's office to shortcut procedural due 
process. The attorney has not been paid for the special 
appearance nor this appeal and was brought into the case 
by the Attorney General and placed in a position where he 
had to respond at great expense or see a former client be 
denied due process, and it is reasonable that the State be 
required to pay costs and a reasonable fee of $1,000.00. 
CONCLUSION 
The welfare recovery division performs an Executive 
service in stimulating the payment of support. This area 
was formerly handled by private persons through private 
counsel. The division is continually expanding government 
into the private sector on the basis of recouping welfare, 
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which was the original grant of authority. They now try pa-
ternity cases, determine fraud and eligibility for relief, 
hear and set amounts of support, handle estates, execute liens, 
and a myriad of judicial functions beyond the scope of leg-
islative authorization. As a part of this expansion, the 
recovery bureau determined an interview with the allegedly 
defaulting obligor would produce the bedt results if conducted 
with the formality of a deposition. Thd deposition is then 
used to support criminal action, induce repayment agreements, 
seize property, or determine deficienci^ncies from support. 
Without affirmative pleadings, the deponent cannot 
limit the scope of the examination nor even be present if his 
former attorney is the only one served, and he is, thus, denied 
due process of law. Mso, the judicial retirement fund is 
dependent upon filing fees, and the state pays none by using 
closed pleadings to initiate action. Further, the attorney 
is placed in an untenable position in having to defend without 
a client or payment for his time or in Jfacing disciplinary 
proceedings for ignoring the notice of [deposition. 
The Court should find this adtion not commenced and 
quash the taking of Defendant's deposition. They should also 
rule that a divorce is final and the attorney discharged up-
on the filing of the decree and award $1,000.00 costs and 
attorney's fees to Don L. Bybee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON L. BYBEE 
Attbrney at Law 
Nanp. Novinski-Durando 
Associate 
-15-
